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When the United Nations (UN) as an international organization was finally founded in 1945 
with the signature and subsequent entry into force of the UN Charter,1 its constitutive 
document, one of its main purposes was the maintenance of international peace and security.2 
After the atrocities of the First and Second World War, respectively, the attainment of the world 
peace was going to be a priority for the world leaders of the time.3 Similarly, with the two World 
Wars in mind, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination was 
introduced as another leading goal of the organization.4  
In light of the continuous emergence of conflicts in different parts of the globe, the UN had to 
act. As a response, the UN created what became to be known as ‘peacekeeping,’ i.e. “a type 
of military action, used as a tool in the UN system of collective security, which is consent based 
and tries to maintain or preserve peace with no or only a minimal use of force.”5  
Soon thereafter, this type of peace operation was going to be widely acknowledged, and three 
fundamental principles for the conduct of this traditional way of peacekeeping were 
consolidated, which are consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-
defence and defence of the mandate.6 
Nevertheless, with the proliferation of conflicts, new forms of peace operations originated. In 
this vein, UN peace operations have developed from traditional peacekeeping operations to 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations,7 and even to peace enforcement operations,8 also 
called robust peacekeeping,9 and operations in partnership with other international and 
regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).10  
While traditional peacekeeping includes observance and monitoring of hostilities and 
ceasefires and is more focused on the deployment of unarmed or moderately armed forces, 
known as “blue helmets” or “blue berets,” to address interstate conflicts,11 multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations are “composed of a range of components including military, civilian 
                                                          
1 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations – Introductory Note, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/introductory-note/index.html (last accessed on 13/04/2020).  
2 Art. 1 para. 1 of the UN Charter. 
3 Preamble of the UN Charter.  
4 Art. 1 para. 3 of the UN Charter.  
5 Bothe, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Special Section: Peacekeeping, MN 1, pp. 1174-
1175.  
6 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf, pp. 31-34 (last accessed on 13/04/2020).  
7 Larsen, Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, p. 7.  
8 McCoubrey/White, p. 6.  
9 Chesterman/Johnstone/Malone, p. 333.  
10 Fleck, in: Clapham/Gaeta (eds.), Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, p. 206, 217.  
11 McCoubrey/White (note 8), p. 4; Doyle/Sambanis, p. 12.  
2 
 
police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public 
information and gender.”12 
On the other hand, a departure from the founding principles of traditional peacekeeping has 
taken place in some operations with the establishment of peace enforcement operations, which 
usually consist of economic sanctions or military enforcement actions,13 and which may lack 
the consent, impartiality and non-use of force requirements, as they are “essentially coercive 
action taken against a state or a faction within a state […] to force compliance with decisions 
of the Security Council.”14 These operations are highly controversial because in many cases it 
is difficult to distinguish between purely military enforcement actions, which are mandated 
armed forces of individual States not under UN command, but under that of their respective 
States, and peacekeeping which undertakes enforcement action, which is a mixed approach 
that combines traditional peacekeeping operations with mandated forces.15  
With all the aforementioned types of operations for worldwide peace, it would seem that there 
is a well-established system of collective security and that the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and thus, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is 
guaranteed thanks to the UN and its Members. However, can all this system be considered an 
utopia? Because the practice is far from being a reality.  
Despite the fact that the development of the system over the years is undisputed, and that 
there have been many successful peace operations,16 the number of violations of human rights 
and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by UN peacekeeping forces has increased 
concurrently with the intensification of the missions.17 As a result, the credibility of the UN as 
an international organization that stands for the maintenance of international peace and the 
protection of human rights is at the spotlight but, most importantly: Who will take the 
responsibility for these violations? Will the participating States or the UN incur responsibility? 
Or can perhaps other participating international organizations such as NATO, that in several 
occasions undertakes peace operations authorized by the UN, also assume its responsibility?  
The objective of the present Master’s Thesis is, therefore, to analyse who can bear the 
responsibility for these wrongful acts. On this basis, several matters of contention such as the 
effective control test and the command and control of peace operations will play a decisive 
role.  
                                                          
12 United Nations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping-handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf, p. 1 (last accessed on 
13/04/2020).  
13 McCoubrey/White (note 8), p. 6. 
14 Ibid., p. 18.  
15 Ibid., pp. 11, 19-20; Bothe (note 5), MN 11, p. 1179.  
16 Namely, UNEF and ONUC, among others: See Bothe (note 5), MN 7, pp. 1176-1177. 
17 See, e.g., O’Brien, p. 3; Akonor, p. 35; Zwanenburg, LJIL, Vol. 11, 1998, p. 229, 229. 
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For this aim to be achieved, the Thesis is divided into five sections. In the first place, the legal 
framework for the practice of UN peace operations18 will be discussed in order to understand 
what the power of the UN is to mandate these operations and from whence this power 
emanates (A). Secondly, it will be briefly exposed how peacekeeping missions work and who 
the parties to these operations are, as the system is complex with the involvement of several 
constituents (B). Hereafter, the applicability of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and IHL 
in peacekeeping operations will be assessed, though not before a concise examination of the 
relationship between both fields of law (C). Likewise, selected examples of violations of human 
rights and IHL, concretely sexual exploitation and abuse and human trafficking and sexual 
slavery, will be presented in relation to the most widespread breaches perpetrated by the 
peace forces during the missions (D). Lastly, an evaluation of who can be considered 
responsible for these violations will take place. Thus, it will be addressed whether the 
participating States, the UN, or other international organizations, such as NATO, must assume 
responsibility. This will be pursued through an assessment of the different international and 
national case law dealing with the issue of attribution of conduct and responsibility in peace 
operations in order to ascertain which is the prevailing opinion or, in this context, the most 
supported test and interpretations thereof, to determine the responsibility of the entities 
involved in a peace operation (E).   
In view of the situation, one important question arises: Are UN peacekeepers a protective 
shield in reality, or an additional threat to those disadvantaged people who have to suffer from 
the ravages of conflict?  
                                                          
18 For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that in the Master’s Thesis the broader term ‘peace operations’ will refer 
to both peacekeeping (operations under UN command) and peace enforcement (mandated or authorized 
operations, not under UN command). Likewise, the terms ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘peace forces’ will be used 
interchangeably throughout the Thesis. However, when it is essential to distinguish between both types of 
operations and forces, it will be made plain from the context. Furthermore, the Thesis will focus only on the military 
component of the peace operations.  
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A. Legal framework for the practice of United Nations 
Peace Operations 
Peace operations are complex in nature and have been continuously evolving over time since 
the first UN peace-mandated mission. They comprise “three principal activities: conflict 
prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building.”19 However, even if it may 
seem clear that these are peace-related operations, their substance and driven implications 
have created a legal framework difficult to discern,20 due to the character of an international 
organization as the UN, all the parties and national laws involved, the applicability of rules 
derived from different branches of international law and the matters at stake.21 
Be that as it may, “every peace operation conducted by an organization or arrangement must 
have a legal basis in international law and in the internal law of the organization.”22 Thus, with 
regard to UN peace operations, they must be regulated under the UN Charter, other applicable 
rules of international law, and the internal rules and procedures of the UN.23  
According to Bothe24, there are three different types of provisions in the Charter that allow for 
the practice of peacekeeping operations, namely “substantive enabling provisions,” “formal 
enabling provisions” and “organizational enabling provisions.” Substantive enabling provisions 
refer to those that authorize the organization and/or a particular organ to address a specific 
matter or situation, such as international peace and security; formal enabling provisions 
encompasses those that confer the power to adopt binding decisions to their organs, like the 
power of the Security Council (SC) under Article 25 of the Charter; organizational enabling 
provisions are those that entitle an organ to create subsidiary organs, for instance Article 22 
for the General Assembly (GA) or Article 29 for the SC.25  
Nevertheless, concerning the legal basis of peace operations undertaken by international 
organizations in international law, it must be remembered that generally these organizations 
are not parties to international treaties.26 How can then essential rules originated from IHRL 
and IHL be complied with during the conduct of peacekeeping missions? This is possible owing 
to the fact that it has been acknowledged that international organizations are bound by rules 
of customary international law that are related to their field of work,27 i.e. in the case of the UN, 
with its leading role in the maintenance of international peace and security and the protection 
                                                          
19 UNGA/UNSC, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) of 21/08/2000, UN Doc. 
A/55/305–S/2000/809, para. 10.  
20 Gill et al. (eds.), Leuven Manual, p. 6.  
21 Fleck (note 10), pp. 228-240.  
22 See Rule 4.I.I in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), pp. 34-35.  
23 Rule 4.I.3 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), pp. 35-36. 
24 Bothe (note 5), MN 21, p. 1185. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 37.  
27 See ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
[1980] ICJ Reports 1980, p. 73, para. 37.  
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of human rights, IHRL and IHL would be applicable as other rules of international law to be 
respected during the execution of the missions.28  
On the other hand, in relation to the legal basis of peace operations in the internal rules and 
procedures of the international organization, the UN has for instance formulated policies on 
the structure, planning and deployment of peace operations, which will be reviewed in Section 
B in order to explain the functioning and course of action of peacekeeping missions.  
What is important to understand in this Section is that the SC, as the primary responsible for 
the maintenance of international peace and security and based on the powers conferred on 
it,29 can act under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter depending on the type of peace 
operation that it deems necessary to be conducted.  
I. United Nations Charter: Chapters VI, VII and VIII 
Although now it is established that the practice of peace operations is regulated under 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter,30 the reality is that the term ‘peacekeeping’ as 
such is nowhere to be found in that legal instrument. That may be due to the fact that the 
original aim of these peace operations was not “to replace the means of voluntary settlement 
of disputes which are set out in Chapter VI […], nor the enforcement action envisaged in 
Chapter VII, but rather seek to supplement the purposes and intent of those two Chapters.”31 
Thus, it was even acknowledged by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld that they could 
form part of a new imaginary “Chapter Six and a Half.”32 However, it is somewhat idealistic and 
unreliable, at the same time, to have to envisage a completely new chapter in such an 
international treaty as the UN Charter, simply because those operations need a robust legal 
basis (even when in practice some mandates have been put in place without determining their 
legal foundation)33. 
Therefore, those provisions of the UN Charter aimed at the practice of peace operations are 
the ones stipulated in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.  
Under Chapter VI, the SC has the power to act in the form of “recommendations” to parties to 
a conflict with the aim of settling their dispute by peaceful means.34 This is enshrined in Article 
36 para. 1 of the UN Charter, by which after investigating any “dispute” or “situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute” (Article 34 of the UN Charter), i.e. 
                                                          
28 See Zwanenburg (note 17), pp. 234-237.  
29 Art. 24 paras. 1, 2 of the UN Charter.  
30 Bothe (note 5), MN 22, pp. 1185-186; Fleck (note 10), p. 209; Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 8. 
31 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p. 3.  
32 Ibid. 
33 The first operations mandated by the SC, i.e. ONUC, UNEF II and UNDOF, completely lack any specification 
about their legal basis: See Bothe (note 5), footnote 73, p. 1186.  
34 McCoubrey/White (note 8), p. 19; United Nations (note 31), The Blue Helmets, p. 5. 
6 
 
once ascertained whether a potential danger to the peace exists,35 the SC may recommend 
ex officio36 procedural or methodological measures different from the ones stipulated in Article 
33 of the UN Charter in order to resolve a dispute,37 either an interstate dispute or an internal 
one.38 These peaceful means can range from conflict prevention to settlement of conflicts,39 
as well as consisting of the creation of subsidiary organs (Article 29 of the UN Charter), or the 
deployment of traditional peacekeeping missions.40 However, these are “measures of a non-
coercive nature which possess no legally binding character for the parties to a dispute,”41 in 
short, the parties will resolve their conflict voluntarily by those means if they wish to do so. 
If not, and the situation reaches the point of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression” (Article 39 of the UN Charter), then the SC may resort to its enforcement powers 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, whereby “it can make recommendations (Article 39 of the 
UN Charter), order provisional measures (Article 40 of the UN Charter), or take non-military 
(Article 41 of the UN Charter) or military enforcement (Article 42 of the UN Charter) measures 
according to the exigencies of the particular situation.”42 In contrast to the recommendations 
under Chapter VI, “[t]hese measures are binding on member States if the SC so decides.”43 
Furthermore, the extensive practice of the SC has shown that they can also be addressed to 
non-members, international organizations, non-State entities, and individuals.44 
One of the key provisions in this Chapter VII is Article 42 of the UN Charter, which in 
conjunction with Article 43 of the UN Charter, would allow the SC to take the necessary military 
enforcement actions through armed forces of member States at the disposal of the SC.45 
Nevertheless, this centralized system envisaged in the Charter did not succeed, since the 
required special agreements pursuant to Article 43 of the UN Charter that would enable the 
provision of the forces were never concluded, and the Military Staff Committee (Article 47 of 
the UN Charter) created to control the operations under the umbrella of the SC was soon 
forgotten.46 For this reason, other forms of military enforcement were needed to be 
implemented for the development of the system of collective security and the enforcement 
powers of the SC. This was possible thanks to the establishment of peacekeeping missions, 
where it is essential to differentiate between “peacekeeping operations under UN command 
with troops supplied by member States on an ad hoc basis, and member States operations 
                                                          
35 Giegerich, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 36, MN 31, p. 1130.  
36 Ibid., MN 35, p. 1131.  
37 Ibid., MN 25-26, p. 1128; MN 44, p. 1134.  
38 Ibid., MN 28, p. 1129. 
39 UNSC, Statement by the President of the Security Council of 29/06/2010, UN Doc. S/PRST/2010/11, p. 1.  
40 Bothe (note 5), MN 21ff, pp. 1185-1187.  
41 Tomuschat, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 33, MN 2, p. 1070.  
42 Krisch, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General 
Framework, MN 12, p. 1243.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., MN 65-69, p. 1268-1271.  
45 Krisch, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 42, MN 3, p. 1333, MN 8, p. 1335.  
46 Ibid., MN 8, p. 1335-1336.  
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authorized, but not conducted, by the SC.”47 Whereas the operations under UN command are 
centralized, those only authorized by the SC are decentralized, and while now it is practice 
that both types of operations can resort to the use of force beyond self-defence,48 they both 
entail different consequences when it comes to the attribution and responsibility of conduct, 
even though sometimes it is not so clear.49 These decentralized operations have become the 
most widespread course of action under Article 42 of the UN Charter, which must be read 
together with Article 48 of the UN Charter, since both Articles imply the possibility of taking 
action by authorized forces of member States.50   
Nonetheless, these are not the only peace operations that can be undertaken under the 
Charter, since pursuant to Chapter VIII, regional organizations themselves or in conjunction 
with the SC can address “matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security” (Article 52 of the UN Charter). Thus, through Article 52 para. 2 of the UN Charter, 
member States are encouraged to refer to their regional organizations51 any interstate or 
internal disputes52 that may have arisen between them, in order to be resolved by peaceful 
means before bringing them to the SC.53 For this reason, Article 52 of the UN Charter must be 
read together with Chapter VI of the UN Charter.54  
By contrast, Article 53 para. 1 of the UN Charter empowers the SC to use these regional 
organizations for enforcement purposes with its authorization. In this regard, it must be treated 
jointly with Chapter VII,55 which in practice has been the recurrent legal basis resorted to in the 
resolutions of the SC for the authorization of the use of force by regional arrangements or 
agencies.56 This authorized use of force by the SC under Article 53 para. 1 or Article 42 of the 
UN Charter is essential for an action involving enforcement measures to be considered legal 
or not.57 A clear example is the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which, independently of 
whether NATO can be seen as a regional arrangement or agency within the meaning of 
Chapter VIII, is said to lack both explicit and implicit authorization by the SC for the use of 
force.58 Subsequently, the SC assumed responsibility for Kosovo by virtue of Resolution 
                                                          
47 Ibid., MN 3, p. 1333.  
48 Ibid., MN 8-13, pp. 1335-1338.  
49 This is examined in Section E of the Thesis.  
50 Krisch (note 45), Art. 42, MN 10-11, pp. 1336-1337. 
51 For a definition and examples of the term “regional arrangements or agencies” used in the Charter, see Walter, 
in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 52, MN 48-74, pp. 1459-1568. 
52 Ibid., MN 78-79, p. 1469.  
53 This is possible owing to the principle of regional priority, which has been modified in the real practice resulting 
in a certain form of concurrent jurisdiction between the regional organizations and the UN: See, Walter (note 51), 
Art. 52, MN 80-109, pp. 1470-1477.  
54 Walter, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Introduction to Chapter VIII, MN 3, p. 1434.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid., MN 31-34, pp. 1443-1444.  
57 Walter, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 53, MN 30, p. 1489.  
58 Ibid., MN 46-47, pp. 1494-1495; Schreuer, Is there a Legal Basis for the NATO Intervention in Kosovo?, 
https://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/60_kosovo.pdf, pp. 151-153 (last accessed on 14/04/2020); UNSC 
Res. 1160 of 31/03/1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); UNSC Res. 1199 of 23/09/1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1199 
(1998); UNSC Res. 1203 of 24/10/1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998). 
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1244,59 but without supporting the unilateral military intervention carried out by NATO countries 
before, probably in violation of international law.60  
Consequently, clear mandates need to be implemented in order to avoid situations as the 
aforementioned one in Kosovo. However, this is hardly ever the case, as it will be seen in the 
subsequent Section. 
II. United Nations Mandate 
Peace operations performed under the umbrella of the UN require a mandate which provides 
firstly the legal basis, that can complement the Host State consent for the operation, i.e. in 
traditional peacekeeping operations; and, secondly, the objectives to be achieved by means 
of the specific mission, including the explicit or implicit parameters for the use of force during 
the operation.61 UN mandates are usually issued by the SC, and they take the form of 
regulations.62 But also the GA can dictate those mandates under the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, as it has happened on several occasions due to the impasse of the SC and the 
necessity for action.63  
Nevertheless, resolutions that authorize the use of force beyond self-defence, i.e. those 
regarding peace enforcement operations, are commonly mandated by the SC under Chapter 
VII of the Charter. Mandates adopted under this Chapter will prevail over any conditions 
imposed by the Host State to the peace operation,64 and even if the Host State has not given 
consent to the deployment of troops in its territory and/or to the use of force beyond self-
defence.65 In this case, a mandate issued by the SC is a “strict legal requirement […] 
irrespective of whether the operation is conducted by the UN directly, by a regional 
organization or arrangement or by individual States operating independently of the UN or any 
other organization, but with the authorization of the SC.”66 
In view of what was previously stated, mandates need to be free from ambiguity because many 
factors are at stake. Furthermore, for the legality of a certain peace operation not to be 
questioned, these resolutions in the form of mandates need to enter into effect.67 However, the 
practice has been shown to be different, since the SC does not often issue clear or adequate 
                                                          
59 UNSC Res. 1244 of 10/06/1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).  
60 Simma, EJIL, Vol. 10, 1999, p. 1, 6; Cassese, EJIL, Vol. 10, 1999, p. 791, 799.  
61 See Rule 3.1.2 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), pp. 27-28.  
62 Bothe (note 5), MN 25, p. 1187.  
63 UNGA Res. 377 (V), Uniting for Peace Resolution of 03/11/1950, UN Doc. A/RES/377(V) A, para. 1. An example 
of a GA mandate is UNEF I, legal after the ICJ acknowledged the power of the GA to mandate peacekeeping 
operations: See ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion, [1962] ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151, p. 163.  
64 Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), Rule 3.2.2, p. 29. 
65 Ibid., Rule 3.3.I, p. 30.  
66 See Rule 3.3, which has the status of jus cogens: Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 30.  
67 Fleck (note 10), p. 219.  
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mandates for the conduct of the operations,68 and since due to the character of peacekeeping, 
negotiations between the UN and States willing to provide personnel are a lengthy process,69 
resulting in situations where “the pressure of emergencies overshadows legal 
considerations.”70 Yet, this cannot be accepted as a justification for the SC not to provide the 
legal basis under which it authorizes peace missions,71 even if the process for conducting the 
missions is complex, as it will be ascertained thereafter in Section B.  
B. Conduct and parties to United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations  
I. United Nations and its Organs 
As it has been previously stated, the SC is the main organ with authority to determine whether 
a UN peacekeeping operation should be deployed in a given country.72 To this end, it may 
assess a number of factors73 for the establishment of the mission. The eventual peacekeeping 
operation will be considered a subsidiary organ of the UN organ mandating the operation, i.e. 
the SC, or the GA on very rare occasions.74  
The UN Secretary-General (SG) also plays a decisive role throughout the process of deciding 
to deploy a peacekeeping operation by means of implementing assessments of the situation, 
in order to finally issue a proposal for the SC recommending the establishment of an 
operation.75 “The Security Council may then pass a resolution authorizing the United Nations 
peacekeeping operation’s deployment and determining its size and mandate.”76 
Once a peacekeeping operation has been decided to take place, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) comes into play. This department constitutes a special 
division of the UN Secretariat, headed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations (USG DPKO).77 “The overall command is vested in the Secretary-General; day-to-
day management of peacekeeping operations is delegated to the […] USG DPKO.”78 
                                                          
68 Ibid., pp. 212-213; McCoubrey/White (note 8), p. 13.  
69 Krisch, in: Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 43, MN 13, p. 1356. 
70 Fleck (note 10), p. 219.  
71 The SC did not specify the legal basis for the operations ONUC, UNEF II and UNDOF in their respective 
resolutions: Bothe (note 5), footnote 73, p. 1186. 
72 Capstone Doctrine (note 6), p. 47.  
73 See UNSC, Statement by the President of the Security Council of 03/05/1994, S/PRST/1994/22, p. 2.  
74 Bothe (note 5), MN 17, p. 1183; UNGA, Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and 
operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General of 09/10/1958, UN Doc. A/3943, para. 127.  
75 See “Strategic Assessment” and “Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)” in Capstone Doctrine (note 6), pp. 48-
49.  
76 Ibid., p. 49.  
77 See Bothe (note 5), MN 17, pp. 1183-1184. 
78 Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), Appendix IV, para. 12, p. 356.  
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Furthermore, the SC vests “operational authority” for directing the operations in the SG,79 which 
in turn delegates “overall responsibility” to the USG DPKO.80  
There are three different levels of authority in UN peacekeeping operations, namely strategic, 
operational and tactical, which are not clear-cut81, since they may overlap.82 The process 
above described between the SC, SG, DPKO and USG DPKO is included in the strategic level.  
Between the strategic and operational levels is the Head of Mission (HOM), which possesses 
“overall authority” over the activities performed in the mission area, and delegates “the 
operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components 
of the mission,” specifically to the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police 
Component (HOPC).83 Consequently, both HOMC and HOPC exercise “UN operational 
control” over military and police personnel and contingents supplied by member States, 
respectively.84 This “operational control” is effected among the operational and tactical levels 
of the mission,85 and it enables the HOMC and HOPC to divide the tasks among units and 
subunits within the military and police components in the mission area of responsibility.86  
However, will this exercised “operational control” be sufficient for the attribution of conduct for 
wrongful acts by peacekeeping forces (under UN command) to the UN as a whole? In this 
respect, “UN operational control” is central to the analysis of the Thesis, and it will be further 
developed in the last Section E regarding the ‘Responsibility for the violations by United 
Nations Peacekeeping Forces.’ Now, it is relevant to determine the role of the State where 
peacekeeping forces are deployed to accomplish a mandate.  
II. Host State 
The Host State is thus the “State upon whose territory the [peacekeeping] force has been 
sent.”87 This entails difficulties due to the principle of sovereignty of the nations, recognized as 
one of the founding principles of the UN.88 Therefore, the consent of the Host State is important 
for the conduct of peacekeeping operations, but not essential, since pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the Charter, the SC can initiate coercive action against any member State without a given 
previous consent.89 
                                                          
79 DPKO/DFS, Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations of 
15/02/2008, Ref. 2008.4, para. 18, p. 6.  
80 Ibid., para. 19; Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), Appendix IV, para. 18, p. 358.  
81 See Capstone Doctrine (note 6), p. 66.  
82 To have a clearer understanding, see the figure presented in the Policy on Authority, Command and Control in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (note 79), p. 5.  
83 Ibid., paras. 24-33, pp. 7-9.  
84 Ibid. Concerning UN operational control of HOMC go to paras. 29, 44-48 and for HOPC go to paras. 32, 54-58. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid., paras. 45 and 54.  
87 Di Blase, in: Cassese (ed.), p. 55, 55.  
88 Art. 2 paras. 1 and 4 of the UN Charter.  
89 Art. 2 para. 7 of the UN Charter; Fleck (note 10), p. 219. 
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Nevertheless, traditional peacekeeping practice (without enforcement measures) seeks the 
consent of the Host State, which can be enshrined in a declaration issued by the State 
concerned accepting the terms of the resolution.90 Furthermore, and in relation to the 
sovereignty of the Host State,91 a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has to be stipulated in 
order to consolidate the respect for the law of the Host State by the peacekeeping forces,92 but 
with exceptions as to the precedence the mandate acquires over incompatible Host State’s 
laws, or the strict compliance of peacekeeping operations with IHRL and IHL even if the Host 
State does not observe these branches of international law.93 In addition, SOFAs further 
regulate the exclusive jurisdiction of the participating States over their military personnel in 
regards to criminal prosecution,94 and more generally, the immunities and privileges the 
peacekeeping personnel enjoy while acting in their official capacity.95 
The Host State has, consequently, “[t]he primary responsibility for the security and protection 
of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and assets,”96 but what is then the responsibility of 
the States providing troops and personnel for the peacekeeping missions? 
III. Participating States 
Due to the fact that the UN does not possess standing military or police forces, it has to resort 
to its Members for the contribution of the same on a voluntary basis.97 These States providing 
personnel and services to the UN for the conduct of peacekeeping operations are the so called 
participating States,98 where two predominant categories of States stand out, namely the Troop 
(TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs).  
For this relation to be consummated, the UN and TCCs/PCCs enter into international 
agreements which usually take the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), i.e. an 
arrangement “to establish the administrative, logistics and financial terms and conditions 
[which] govern the contribution of personnel, equipment, and services provided by the 
Government in support of [the peacekeeping operation] and to specify United Nations 
standards of conduct for personnel provided by the Government.”99 This is a legally binding 
                                                          
90 See Bothe (note 5), MN 17, p. 1183.  
91 Ibid., MN 26, p. 1188; see Rule 9.I ff in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), pp. 130-131.  
92 Rule 9.2 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 130.  
93 Rule 9.2.4 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), pp. 133-134.  
94 See UNGA, Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations of 09/10/1990, UN Doc. A/45/594, 
para. 47 (b).  
95 Ibid., paras. 3, 4, 15, 24-28, 46: The privileges and immunities are compiled in the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946; on the contrary, if the Host State is not a party to the 
latter, the SOFA will specifically determine those which apply to the peacekeeping operation.  
96 Capstone Doctrine (note 6), p. 79. 
97 Ibid., p. 52.  
98 UNGA, Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and 
Equipment to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations of 23/05/1991, UN Doc. A/46/185, Annex, para. 1.  
99 UNGA, Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) of 20/01/2015, UN 
Doc. A/C.5/69/18, Chapter 9, Article 3, p. 187.  
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document between the UN and the TCC/PCC,100 and it acquires special relevance owing to 
the transfer of command and control powers from the participating State to the UN.101 However, 
the participating State retains certain obligations in connection with its national contingents, 
such as “full and exclusive strategic level command and control,”102 administrative power,103 
and disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction.104 Furthermore, it has to obey the rules set forth in 
the respective SOFA created between the UN and the Host State for the deployment of the 
mission in the Host State’s territory.105  
By contrast, as it has been previously exposed (A.I.), the forces contributed by participating 
States for a peacekeeping operation, which are in essence national contingents at the disposal 
of the UN based on an agreement (UN subsidiary organs)106, have to be distinguished from 
mandated forces of States acting with SC authorization under Chapter VII. These mandated 
forces are not UN organs, but organs of their sending States.107 Thus, even though it could be 
obvious to assume that the attribution and responsibility for the conduct of the mandated forces 
would rest with their respective States (since they are not UN organs), there has already been 
case law108 reversing this idea. The different participation of States in peace operations and 
the attribution of conduct within the command and control structure is, therefore, a complex 
and controversial problem which will be fully assessed in Section E.  
Apart from the already added hurdle of finding countries willing to provide forces for 
peacekeeping missions, the aforementioned problem in the preceding paragraph is also 
intensified depending on the personnel contributed to the operation. Peacekeepers, or peace 
forces, in general, have to show “extraordinary professionalism, dedication and self-
restraint.”109 However, on more than one occasion, there have been claims regarding the 
performance of actions by the personnel contrary to their duties or, more specifically, violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law that question not only the reputation of the participating 
States, but also of the UN, and what is worse, that may leave victims without remedy.110 The 
UN enjoys jurisdictional immunity everywhere in the world,111 and who can truly ensure that 
the contributing States will exercise their disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction over their national 
contingents?  
                                                          
100 Ibid., Chapter 2, para. 6, p. 8.  
101 See UN Model Agreement (note 98), para. 7.  
102 DPKO/DFS, Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (note 79), 
para. 21, p. 7.  
103 See UN Model Agreement (note 98), para. 9.  
104 See COE Manual (note 99), Chapter 9, Art. 7 quinquiens, p. 192.  
105 Ibid., Art. 7 ter para. 7.5, pp. 189-190; UN Model Agreement (note 98), para. 5.  
106 See Bothe (note 5), MN 18, p. 1184.  
107 Ibid., MN 33, pp. 1192-1193.  
108 ECtHR, Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Grand Chamber, 
Admissibility Decision, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01, 2 May 2007.  
109 Capstone Doctrine (note 6), p. 78.  
110 See Bothe (note 5), MN 19, p. 1185.  
111 Ibid.  
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Consequently, peacekeeping forces have an obligation to protect the civilian population in the 
territory where the peacekeeping mission takes place, and should refrain from any act in 
violation of IHRL and IHL. Thus, it is important to determine how these two fields of law are 
applicable to peace operations.  
C. The relationship between International Human Rights 
Law and International Humanitarian Law: Their 
applicability to United Nations Peace Operations 
Before entering to examine the violations of human rights and humanitarian law norms 
committed by peace forces, it is necessary to recall how IHRL and IHL apply to peace 
operations under the umbrella of the UN, and the relationship between these two branches of 
international law. 
Even though traditionally there was a strict division between them, IHRL being considered as 
the law of peace and IHL as the law of war,112 today this separation is not so clear since it has 
been acknowledged that IHRL also applies in situations of armed conflict.113 It is not surprising 
bearing in mind that both fields of law pursue the respect for and protection of the lives and 
human dignity of every person,114 fundamental rights that should be guaranteed at any time, 
no matter if during times of peace or war.   
By contrast, there might be situations where there are two or more conflicting rules deriving 
from each branch of law that lead to different results.115 How to discern which law ought to be 
respected then? A common approach to resolve this controversy has been to resort to the lex 
specialis principle,116 according to which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized in 
the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the applicability of IHRL in armed conflicts, but at the 
same time, affirmed the prevalence of IHL over IHRL during the conduct of hostilities owing to 
the specificity that IHL provides in the context of armed conflicts.117 In other words, the ICJ 
overrode the protection that IHRL could offer in conflict situations in favour of the IHL as the 
lex specialis. In the Legal Consequences of the Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ also confirmed 
the applicability of IHL as the lex specialis, but it went further to reinforce the idea of IHRL as 
a complementary aid for interpretation.118 Furthermore, the ICJ followed this same reasoning 
                                                          
112 Sassòli, MN 9.01, 9.05, pp. 422, 423.   
113 Droege, IsLR, Vol. 40, 2007, pp. 310, 320-324.  
114 Sassòli., MN 9.10, p. 425; Meron, in: Warner (ed.), p. 97, 100; Heintze, in: Kolb/Gaggioli (eds.), p. 53, 53.  
115 Sassòli, MN 9.26, p. 433. 
116 Ibid., MN 9.27, p. 433.  
117 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 
25. 
What the ICJ concretely accepted in this Advisory Opinion was the possible applicability of Art. 6 ICCPR (Right to 
Life) rather than the whole body of IHRL.  
118 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
[2004] ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 106. 
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in its subsequent DRC v. Uganda case, but avoided to make any reference to the lex 
specialis.119 
This new approach by the ICJ could be explained due to the fact that the maxim lex specialis 
derogat legi generali is contentious if IHL is always regarded as the lex specialis only because 
it is the law designated for armed conflicts; it is like undervaluing IHRL determining it as 
“normal” compared to the “special” IHL.120 Thus, it is now acknowledged that “in situations of 
conflicts of norms, the most detailed and specific rule should be chosen over the more general 
rule, on the basis of a case-by-case analysis, irrespective of whether it was a human rights or 
a humanitarian law norm.”121  
Consequently, the interplay between IHRL and IHL has resulted in three different theories, 
namely a traditional separation theory122, a complementarity theory123, and an integration 
theory124. Irrespective of what approach is more widely accepted,125 the fact cannot be refuted 
that both branches of international law possess an essence of non-derogable human rights 
and of minimum humanitarian rules, respectively, which enjoy jus cogens status,126 i.e. which 
are “peremptory norm[s] of general international law […] from which no derogation is 
permitted.”127 Those absolute rights and rules are mainly enshrined in Article 4 para. 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in Common Article 3128 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions (GCs). Here is where the principle of humanity acquires significant 
importance demonstrating that in situations of necessity, what prevails is the human being. Or 
at least, that should be the case. This is what the UN within its system of collective security 
tries to achieve with the deployment of its peace operations in situations of conflict. Therefore, 
after ascertaining that both IHRL and IHL apply in armed conflicts, it is essential to assess now 
how those two bodies of international law apply during UN peace operations.  
  
                                                          
119 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
[2005] ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 216.  
120 Oberleitner, pp. 96-97.  
121 UN Human Rights Council, Outcome of the Expert Consultation on the Issue of Protecting the Human Rights of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 04/06/2009, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/11/31, para. 13.  
122 Scobbie, JCSL, Vol. 14, 2010, p. 449, 456; Feinstein, JHR, Vol. 4, 2005, p. 238, 301.  
123 It is backed up by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC): see General Comment No. 31 (Article 2) on the 
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant of 26/05/2004, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, para. 11; also supported by the ICRC: see Kellenberger, in: International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law (ed.), pp. 9, 9-15; and by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion and DRC v. Uganda case: See 
Gowlland-Debbas/Gaggioli, in: Kolb/Gaggioli (eds.), pp. 77, 86-87.  
124 For a comprehensive overview of scholars who support this approach see Oberleitner (note 120), pp. 122-128. 
125 It seems that the most supported theory regarding the relationship between IHRL and IHL is the one of 
complementarity. See supra note 123.  
126 Abi-Saab, in: Warner (ed.), p. 107, 121. 
127 Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). For a further insight on jus cogens see the 
commentary on Art. 40 paras. 4-6 DARSIWA (infra note 235). 
128 Recognized by the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment, [1986], Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 218. 
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I. International Human Rights Law 
Once it has been determined that IHRL is applicable at all times,129 either during peace or war 
times, it can be established that it is a body of law to be applicable to peace operations.130 In 
this regard, the importance of human rights obligations during these operations needs to be 
considered under three aspects, namely through the issuing of a mandate that should 
expressly lay down the observance of human rights by the parties to the conflict and the 
peacekeeping forces; whether the request to protect human rights has been expressly 
introduced in the mandate or not, peacekeeping forces also have a duty to respect the law of 
the Host State and its obligations under international law; and, finally, it has been 
acknowledged that the human rights obligations of the participating States apply 
extraterritorially131 for acts committed within their jurisdiction.132   
Therefore, owing to the aforementioned factors that play a part in a UN peace operation, the 
human rights obligations applicable to the same derive from “the international obligations of 
the contributing States and/or from those of the international organization undertaking the 
operation and may be based on treaty and/or customary law provisions.”133 Since the members 
of a UN peace operation are national contingents at the disposal of the UN and the operation 
acquires the status of a subsidiary organ, the peacekeeping forces are bound by both the 
human rights obligations of their respective States and those of the UN.134 They have a “unique 
hybrid legal status.”135 
                                                          
129 This has been upheld by the ICJ, according to which “the protection offered by human rights conventions does 
not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in 
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”: See Legal Consequences of the Wall Advisory 
Opinion (note 118), para. 106. It has also been acknowledged in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (note 117) 
and the DRC v. Uganda case (note 119).  
Furthermore, Art. 15 ECHR expressly specifies that derogation from some obligations is allowed in “time of war” 
and Art. 15 para. 2 ECHR explicitly alludes to the permissible derogation from the right to life in cases of “lawful 
acts of war.” 
Therefore, the derogation clauses in Art. 4 ICCPR and Art. 15 ECHR are evidence of the continual applicability of 
human rights treaties in time of public emergency, including in armed conflicts.  
See also Kleffner, in: Gill/Fleck (eds.), Handbook of International Law of Military Operations, Section 3.01, para. 35, 
p. 35, 53; Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 76.  
130 Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 76.  
131 The extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties has been confirmed by the HRC in its interpretation of 
Art. 2 para. 1 of the ICCPR when it stated that “a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory 
of the State Party. […] This principle also applies to those […] forces constituting a national contingent of a State 
Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.”: See HRC, General Comment 
No. 31 (note 123), para. 10.  
This has also been acknowledged by the ECtHR: For an insight see ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, App. No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para. 62; ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment, App. 
No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, para. 77; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, App. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para. 137.  
The ICJ has further sustained this position in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, paras. 111-112.  
132 Klappe, in: Fleck (ed.), Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Section 1307, pp. 611, 619-620.  
133 See Rule 5.I in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 77. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Dannenbaum, HarvIntlLJ, Vol. 51, 2010, p. 113, 115. 
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Another question is, however, how an international organization as the UN can be an 
addressee of IHRL, when States are the main addressees and international organizations are 
usually not parties to human rights treaties.136 This is possible due to the international legal 
personality of the UN that makes it bound by customary IHRL.137 Furthermore, the 
incorporation of the respect for human rights as one of its founding principles in the UN Charter 
reinforces the role of the UN as a provider of human rights obligations.138 Even UN human 
rights obligations may be seen as the prevailing norm by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter 
when it comes to conduct authorized by the SC, but conflicting with the human rights 
obligations of a respective participating State.139  
The UN has also developed policies such as the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy140 
and the UN Human Rights Screening Policy141 which apply to peace operations.142 In addition, 
TCCs must guarantee that their contributed forces and military personnel do not commit 
human rights violations.143 If that is ensured in reality remains to be seen.  
II. International Humanitarian Law 
For its part, IHL is the law of armed conflict.144 As such, it is applicable to a peace operation 
“when the conditions for the application of this body of law are met, irrespective of the nature 
of the operation,”145 in other words, when the prevailing facts on the ground lead one to 
ascertain that the required threshold for the existence of an armed conflict has been reached. 
This threshold varies based on “classic” criteria which have to be fulfilled in order to determine 
whether the conflict in question is an international (IAC) or non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) by virtue of IHL.146 
In this regard, Common Article 2 of the 1949 GCs regulates IACs, i.e. any resort to hostile 
military action between two or more States,147 including any kind of “foreign military 
occupation.”148 By contrast, Common Article 3 of the GCs alludes to NIACs, which are said to 
                                                          
136 Kleffner (note 129), Section 3.01, para. 33, pp. 51-52. 
137 Ibid.; The international legal personality of the UN has furthermore been acknowledged by the ICJ: See ICJ, 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Reports 1949, p. 
174, pp. 178-179. 
138 ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, [1980] 
ICJ Reports 1980, p. 73, para. 37; see Art. 1 para. 3 of the UN Charter.  
139 See Rule 5.7.5 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 87. 
140 UNSG, UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security 
Forces of 05/03/2013, UN Doc. A/67/775 – S/2013/110, Annex.  
141 UN, Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel, 
https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/policy_on_human_rights_screening_of_un_personnel_december_2012.pdf 
(last accessed on 16/04/2020).  
142 Rule 5.9 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 90. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Sassòli, MN 9.01, 9.05, pp. 422, 423. 
145 Rule 6.I in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 91.  
146 Ferraro, IRRC, Vol. 95, 2013, p. 561, 574.  
147 For a detailed insight see, e.g., ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, Art. 2: Application of 
the Convention, para. 209. 
148 Ibid., para. 193.  
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be taking place when two requirements are satisfied, namely a certain level of organization of 
the parties to the conflict, and a specific intensity of the violence.149  
Generally, rules of IHL are binding mainly upon States, organized armed groups and 
individuals.150 Nevertheless, owing to the proliferation of conflicts and the subsequent 
deployment of peace operations, the legal practice and interpretation has evolved to include 
international organizations in the scope of IHL due to their being subjects with international 
legal personality and thus, bound by customary IHL.151 This has enabled them to become 
parties to armed conflicts.152  
In this context of international organizations undertaking peace operations, one more matter 
of controversy has been whether the TCCs that have placed nationals at the international 
organization’s disposal, the international organization or both are parties to the armed conflict. 
Once again, the matter of command and control comes into play when addressing this question 
and,153 particularly, the issue of effective control.154 Consequently, according to usual UN 
practice,155 it is generally submitted that only the UN peace operation, as a subsidiary organ 
of the UN, should become the party to the armed conflict, and not the UN as a whole or the 
TCCs.156 However, it would also be possible that the peace forces “engage in combat 
operations without being treated as a party to an armed conflict. In such a case, it is accepted 
that the force[s] [have] a duty to comply with the principles and spirit of the principal 
conventions on IHL.”157 
Unlike the UN, NATO command and control structures in peace operations differ from that of 
the UN in a way that TCCs have the main control over their forces in the operations and, 
therefore, both the TCCs and NATO (but not all NATO member States) are to be considered 
parties to the armed conflict when the threshold for triggering IHL applicability has been 
reached.158 This notion of “dual attribution”159 will also be crucial for determining the bearer of 
                                                          
149 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, Art. 3: Conflicts not of an international character, 
para. 387 ff.  
150 See Kleffner (note 129), Section 3.01, paras. 21-25, pp. 45-49. 
151 Ibid., para. 23; Ferraro (note 146), p. 575. 
152 Kleffner (note 129), Section 3.01, para. 23, p. 46; Greenwood, YIHL, Vol. 1, 1998, p. 3, 16.  
153 Ferraro (note 146), pp. 588-595. 
154 According to Zwanenburg, the effective control test proposed by the ILC to analyse the responsibility of 
international organizations should also be used for determining who is to become a party to an armed conflict within 
the international organization-TCCs spectrum, since “[i]f we consider international law as one system, it is logical 
to answer similar questions in a similar way.”: See Zwanenburg, Collegium N° 42, 2012, p. 23, 26; see also Art. 7 
DARIO (infra note 236), even though effective control is not defined.  
155 It is not a fixed rule and has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on the military structure of the 
peace operation deployed.  
156 Ferraro (note 146), pp. 592-593; Rule 6.5.4 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 100. 
157 Greenwood (note 152), p. 34. 
158 Ferraro (note 146), pp. 593-594.  
159 This has been recognized by the ILC in the commentary on DARIO, Chapter II: Attribution of Conduct to an 
International Organization, para. 4, p. 83 (see infra note 236). 
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responsibility for violations of human rights and IHL by peace forces, in other words, if joint 
responsibility is possible. This will be examined in Section E.  
Apart from all the aforementioned and other contentious issues160 that cannot be subject to 
analysis due to the length of the Thesis, it is undisputed that the UN has acknowledged as well 
the applicability of IHL to its peace forces through internal policies such as the Secretary-
General’s 1999 Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law.161 Furthermore, it is established that peace operations “are bound by the 
obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect for’ IHL.”162 
In light of the increasing allegations concerning human rights as well as IHL violations, one 
may call into question whether this duty to observe both IHRL and IHL by the peace forces is 
only a formality. The factual background about the alleged violations committed by peace 
forces will be the focus of analysis in the subsequent Section D.  
D. Violations of human rights and International 
Humanitarian Law committed by United Nations 
Peacekeepers 
When peacekeepers are deployed in a conflict zone, one of their main and most important 
mandates is the protection of the vulnerable population,163 among other objectives specific to 
the needs of the country in conflict. Nevertheless, if these peace forces were actually 
accomplishing their tasks, allegations of violations of human rights and IHL by members of the 
peacekeeping community would not be coming to light since the 90s.164 Even though the UN 
has introduced policies165, codes of personal conduct166 and resolutions167 to tackle this plight, 
it is still doubtful whether it aims at the complete eradication of the violations or if, instead, the 
policies are only a cover to improve its public image while concealing the reality of this 
                                                          
160 Once the applicability of IHL to peace operations has been admitted, other controversial issues are the actual 
application of IHL to the operations in the personal and geographical scopes. For an in-depth analysis see Ferraro 
(note 146), pp. 599-603, 608-612.  
161 UNSG, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law of 06/08/1999, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13.  
162 Rule 6.5.7 in Gill et al. (eds.), (note 20), p. 101. 
163 See Johnson, in: De Coning/Peter, p. 133, 133: “More than 98% of military and police personnel currently 
deployed in peace operations have a mandate to protect civilians […].” For an insight into missions established with 
the main objective of protecting civilians see as an example MONUSCO (UNSC Res. 1925 of 28/05/2010, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1925 (2010), paras. 11, 12 (a) (c)); MINUSCA (UNSC Res. 2149 of 10/04/2014, UN Doc. S/RES/2149 
(2014), para. 30 (a)). 
164 O’Brien, p. 3.  
165 Policies that should be taken note of are the ‘Zero-tolerance policy’: UNSG, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of 09/10/2003, UN Doc. 
ST/SGB/2003/13; OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS, Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and 
Political Missions of 01/09/2011, Ref. 2011.20; DPKO/DFS, Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations 
Peacekeeping of 01/04/2015, Ref. 2015.07; and DPA/DPKO/DFS, Policy on Accountability for Conduct and 
Discipline in Field Missions of 01/08/2015, Ref. 2015.10, among other important documents.  
166 See, e.g., UN, Ten Rules/Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, https://conduct.unmissions.org/ten-
rulescode-personal-conduct-blue-helmets (last accessed on 18/04/2020).  
167 UNSC Res. 2272 of 11/03/2016, UN Doc. S/RES/2272 (2016).  
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egregious problem. These are, in general terms, the rules which prohibit violations in the 
internal law of the UN applicable to peace forces, without forgetting the norms stemming from 
the UN Charter and the mandates issued for each particular mission. Conversely, the 
prohibitions on the reviewed violations that emanate from the external law applicable to the 
UN and, thus, to its forces, in other words, from customary international law, will be examined 
with regard to the specific violations.  
For the purposes of this Section, a compilation of peace missions where allegations of 
violations have arisen will be made in order to establish an illustrative factual background that 
leads us to the difficulty of assigning responsibility in this context of intertwined actors. The 
assessed missions will be with peace forces under UN command as well as those authorized 
or mandated by the SC, i.e. not under UN command. Consequently, sexual exploitation and 
abuse and human trafficking and sexual slavery will be addressed as violations of both human 
rights and IHL by peacekeeping forces during the conduct of their missions.  
I. Sexual exploitation and abuse 
In UN’s parlance, ‘sexual exploitation’ is defined as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position 
of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, 
profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.”168 ‘Sexual 
abuse’ is further defined as “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, 
whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”169 Any behaviour of this nature can 
also qualify as an act of serious misconduct170.  
Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeeping forces are prominent 
in a large number of missions deployed by the UN, including in conflict zones such as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR),171 two 
countries which will be the focus of a brief analysis on the matter in this part of the Thesis.  
Starting with the DRC, the SC established two peace operations in the DRC, namely the United 
Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)172 from July 
1999 to July 2010, which was subsequently renamed as the United Nations Organization 
                                                          
168 UNSG, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse of 09/10/2003, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13, Section 1.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Defined as “misconduct, including criminal acts, that results in, or is likely to result in, serious loss, damage or 
injury to an individual or to a mission”: See COE Manual (note 99), Chapter 2, Annex A, p. 20. 
171 For more missions where alleged violations of sexual exploitation and abuse have taken place see O’Brien, p. 
3; Akonor, pp. 35-51.  
172 UNSC Res. 1279 of 30/11/1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1279 (1999).  
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Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)173, in force from 
July 2010 to this day174.  
One possible reason that might have led to the renaming of MONUC as MONUSCO can be 
due to the discredit that MONUC had fallen into taking into consideration the more than 150 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse during 2003-2004 involving UN military and civilian 
personnel deployed in the mission from participating States such as Nepal, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, South Africa, Pakistan, and France.175 The accusations concerned mainly women 
and girls, many of whom were refugees, who had been raped and forced into prostitution.176 
In the words of the designated adviser for this problem, Prince Zeid, “it would appear that [in 
the DRC] sexual exploitation and abuse mostly involves the exchange of sex for money (on 
average $1-$3 per encounter), for food (for immediate consumption or to barter later) or for 
jobs (especially affecting daily workers).”177 These actions were even regarded by the then 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan as “acts of gross misconduct,”178 demonstrating that the 
problem was known by the UN. Furthermore, allegations continued to emerge in 2008 
regarding the creation of a child prostitution ring and abuses of Congolese girls by Indian 
peacekeeping forces, who, instead, were found innocent by the Indian army.179  
Therefore, there is clear evidence that a culture of silence and impunity was prevalent within 
the peacekeeping community and,180 that despite the strengthening of the duty to protect 
civilians in the MONUSCO’s mandate,181 more allegations surfaced about rapes of young 
girls,182 who very likely had to give birth later to the so-called “peacekeeper babies.”183 
                                                          
173 UNSC Res. 1925 of 28/05/2010, UN Doc. S/RES/1925 (2010).  
174 At the present time, MONUSCO’s mandate has been extended until December 2020: UNSC Res. 2502 of 
19/12/2019, UN Doc. S/RES/2502 (2019), para. 22.  
175 Gardiner, The U.N. Peacekeeping Scandal in the Congo: How Congress Should Respond, 
https://www.heritage.org/report/the-un-peacekeeping-scandal-the-congo-how-congress-should-respond#_ftn3 
(last accessed on 16/04/2020); Lynch, U.N. Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo - Peacekeepers Accused in Draft 
Report, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3145-2004Dec15.html? (last accessed on 16/04/2020); 
Lacey, In Congo War, Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/18/world/africa/in-
congo-war-even-peacekeepers-add-to-horror.html (last accessed on 16/04/2020). 
176 Ibid; UNGA, A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations (Zeid Report) of 24/03/2005, UN Doc. A/59/710, para. 6.  
For a review of some case studies see UNGA, Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo of 05/01/2005, UN Doc. A/59/661, paras. 12-18.  
177 See Zeid Report (note 176), para. 6. 
178 UN, Annan vows to end sex abuse committed by UN mission staff in DR of Congo, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/11/121482-annan-vows-end-sex-abuse-committed-un-mission-staff-dr-congo 
(last accessed on 18/04/2020).  
179 Caplan, Peacekeepers gone wild: How much more abuse will the UN ignore in Congo?, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/second-reading/peacekeepers-gone-wild-how-much-more-abuse-
will-the-un-ignore-in-congo/article4462151/ (last accessed on 18/04/2020).  
180 Ibid.; UNGA, Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (note 176), para. 46.  
181 UNSC Res. 1925 of 28/05/2010, UN Doc. S/RES/1925 (2010), para. 11.  
182 See Caplan (note 179), concretely Case 1.  
183 Zeid Report (note 176), para. 6.  
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In light of the foregoing and taking into consideration the external law surrounding the UN, it is 
firstly submitted, as it has been ascertained in the previous Section C, that both IHRL and 
IHL184 are applicable to UN peace operations. In the second place, sexual exploitation and 
abuse is prohibited in a number of human rights and IHL treaties,185 but since the UN is not a 
party to them, it cannot be bound by their obligations. By contrast, as it is a subject with 
international legal personality, the UN is bound by customary IHRL and IHL. Both fields of 
customary international law prohibit it: 1) customary IHRL prohibits sexual exploitation and 
abuse through the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment,186 since rape and other forms of sexual abuse have been recognized to constitute 
means of torture in the case law of human rights bodies187 and international criminal 
tribunals188, apart from being also considered even jus cogens norms owing to the status that 
the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
has acquired;189 2) customary IHL also prohibits rape and other forms of sexual violence,190 
including sexual exploitation and abuse, due to the fact that they are considered a form of 
sexual violence,191 a prohibition that covers all women, girls, boys and men.192 
                                                          
184 When the conditions for the application of this body of law are met, i.e. there is an armed conflict and the peace 
forces (if not a party to the conflict) are engaged in hostilities. See supra Section C.II. 
185 Sexual exploitation and abuse is not specifically referred to in human rights treaties, but it is submitted that the 
provisions on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment comprise acts of this nature: See 
infra notes 187, 188. They are, furthermore, non-derogable prohibitions: see, e.g., Arts. 4 para. 2, and 7 ICCPR; 
Arts. 15 para. 2, and 3 ECHR; see also Art. 1 Convention against Torture (UNCAT) and the commentary on Art. 40 
para. 5 DARSIWA (infra note 235). 
For IHL treaties prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse, see Art. 14 GC III; Art. 27 GC IV; Arts. 75 (2)(a)(b), 76 
(1), and 77 (1) AP I. See also Common Art. 3 (1)(a)(c) GCs, and Art. 4 (2)(a)(e) AP II.  
186 See the so-called Restatement list of customary IHRL in American Law Institute (ALI), Restatement of the law, 
third. The foreign relations law of the United States, Vol. 2, 1987, para. 702, p. 161.  
Furthermore, see De Schutter, p. 59: “the growing consensus is that most, if not all, of the rights enumerated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have acquired a customary status in international law.” Thus, go to Art. 5 of 
the UNGA Res 217 A (III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10/12/1948, UN Doc. A/RES/3/217A.  
Meron, pp. 93-94 goes further to ascertain that “those rights which are most crucial to the protection of the human 
dignity and of the universally accepted values of humanity, and whose violation triggers broad condemnation by the 
international community” could be considered as customary human rights without necessarily having to fulfilled his 
two indicators of custom, namely the widespread introduction of the right in human rights treaties and its general 
acceptance and incorporation in national laws.  
187 IACHR, Raquel Martín de Mejía v. Perú, Case 10.970, Report No. 5/96, Annual Report 1995, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 
Doc. 7 Rev., 1 March 1996: See part 3 “Analysis” of the 2nd point “Questions raised”; ECtHR, Aydin v. Turkey, 
Judgment, App. No. 57/1996/676/866, 25 September 1997, paras. 83-86. 
Note also the UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kboijroans, on Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 19/02/1986, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, para. 
119.  
188 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Others, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1-A, Judgment (Appeals 
Chamber), 12 June 2002, para. 150; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment 
(Trial Chamber), 2 September 1998, paras. 687-688.  
189 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Juan E. Méndez of 10/04/2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/60, para. 40.  
190 For an extensive assessment see Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Vol. 1: Rules, Rule 93. Moreover, on the practice of this Rule 93 to be considered customary law follow: ICRC, 
Practice Relating to Rule 93. Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule93 (last accessed on 18/04/2020).  
191 Bastick/Grimm/Kunz, p. 19; Krug et al. (eds.), World Report on Violence and Health, World Health Organization 
(WHO), pp. 149-150.  
192 See Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck (eds.), (note 190), Rule 93.  
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Furthermore, it should be noted that sexual exploitation and abuse amount to war crimes in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts,193 and therefore, perpetrators must be 
prosecuted for these crimes by States.  
In addition to this, the UN is implicitly bound by norms related to its field of work, i.e. those 
stemming from its constitutive document, such as the pursuit of the maintenance of 
international peace and security, whereby its obligation to respect human rights and 
humanitarian norms arises and it should not be breached.194  
Now, taking into consideration that the peacekeepers accused of the violations were under UN 
command and control, without forgetting that they are at the same time national contingents, 
even though at the disposal of the UN, they are also bound by their respective participating 
States’ human rights and humanitarian norms obligations (as it has been seen in Section C). 
Therefore, each of them further breached the obligations to which their States had adhered to.  
As a result of this, it can be said that sexual exploitation and abuse in the DRC constituted 
violations of human rights and IHL (if it were ascertained that an armed conflict existed and the 
UN forces engaged in hostilities) committed by UN peacekeeping forces. Who can then incur 
responsibility for these egregious acts: the UN for having been in charge of commanding and 
controlling the operation, or the countries which contributed the accused peacekeeping forces? 
This will be settled in the next Section after examining the mission in the CAR and in Kosovo.  
On the northern border of the DRC lies the CAR. In the CAR, after having previously 
established other peace operations,195 the SC finally deployed in 2014 its United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA)196, which is still ongoing. This was complemented by other parallel authorized 
missions by the SC, such as the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MISCA)197 and, especially, by authorized foreign military forces like the French 
Sangaris forces198, which are of importance in the present case.  
The situation in the CAR is similar to that of the DRC, the main difference being that instead 
of dealing with peacekeeping forces under UN command and control, they were for the most 
part international peacekeepers authorized or mandated by the SC, i.e. not under the direct 
                                                          
193 See Art. 8 (2) lit. b xxii, lit. c ii, lit. e vi of the Rome Statute.  
194 See ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
[1980] ICJ Reports 1980, p. 73, para. 37; Zwanenburg (note 17), p. 234.  
195 Namely the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA): UNSC Res. 1159 of 27/03/1998, 
UN Doc. S/RES/1159 (1998); the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic 
(BONUCA): UNSC, Letter dated 3 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council of 10/12/1999, UN Doc. S/1999/1235; the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the 
Central African Republic (BINUCA): UNSC Res. 2031 of 21/12/2011, UN Doc. S/RES/2031 (2011).  
196 UNSC Res. 2149 of 10/04/2014, UN Doc. S/RES/2149 (2014).  
197 UNSC Res. 2127 of 05/12/2013, UN Doc. S/RES/2127 (2013), para. 28.  
198 Ibid., para. 50; UNSC Res. 2149 of 10/04/2014, UN Doc. S/RES/2149 (2014), para. 47. 
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command of the UN.199 Thus, the French Sangaris forces were authorized to “use all necessary 
means to provide operational support to elements of MINUSCA,”200 in other words, to protect 
the civilian population as it had been set out in the MINUSCA’s mandate as a top priority.201  
Nevertheless, rather than accomplishing their mandate, it could be said that they acted in a 
manner contrary to what they had been deployed for, engaging in acts of serious misconduct 
like sexual exploitation and abuse.  
The first set of allegations arose in 2014 and comprised children as young as 9 years of age 
who had been sexually abused mainly by members of these French Sangaris forces in 
exchange for food and/or small amounts of money.202 Particularly, all the interviews carried out 
by a Human Rights Officer and staff of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
concerned boys of the M’Poko camp for internally displaces persons,203 who were lured by the 
forces trifling with their hunger and vulnerability. Some of the children also reported that they 
had seen their friends performing fellatios, knowing in return what “[they] had to do”204 if they 
wanted to get some food or money. This shows that the problem was widespread and alarming. 
It was further regarded as conflict-related sexual violence within the meaning of the UN.205 In 
the same vein, more sexual exploitation and abuse allegations by UN peacekeepers went 
public between 2015 and 2016, which involved women and girls having been gang-raped, 
raped or engaged in transactional sex.206 
Moreover, it has been claimed that in the CAR “abuse of authority”207 by UN officials took place 
due to the inaction and/or wrongdoings of the same in light of what was happening.208 
“[I]nformation about the allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across 
multiple United Nations offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious 
human rights violations.”209  
                                                          
199 UNGA, Report of an independent review on sexual exploitation and abuse by international peacekeeping forces 
in the Central African Republic of 23/06/2016, UN Doc. A/71/99, p. 2.  
200 UNSC Res. 2149 of 10/04/2014, UN Doc. S/RES/2149 (2014), para. 47. 
201 Ibid., para. 30 (a).  
202 For a complete picture of the allegations and the interviews see the Report of an independent review (note 199), 
pp. 30-33. 
203 Ibid., para. 44, p. 30. 
204 See Interview 4 of the Report of an independent review (note 199), para. 52, p. 32.  
205 Report of an independent review (note 199), p. 33, para. 58. For a definition see UNGA/UNSC, Report of the 
Secretary-General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence of 13/01/2012, UN Doc. A/66/657–S/2012/33, para. 3. 
206 For an insight, see the cases exposed in Human Rights Watch, Central African Republic: Rape by 
Peacekeepers, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/04/central-african-republic-rape-peacekeepers (last accessed 
on 19/04/2020).  
207 Abuse of authority has been defined as “the improper use of a position of influence, power or authority against 
another person.” See UNSG, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Prohibition of Discrimination, Harassment, 
including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority of 11/02/2008, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2008/5, para. 1.4. It has, 
furthermore, to fulfilled a two-step evaluation: see Report of an independent review (note 199), paras. 142-144, p. 
58.  
208 For a comprehensive review in the matter see the Report of an independent review (note 199), pp. 56-64 and 
pp. 76-79.  
209 Ibid., p. 2.  
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Additionally, there are two groups of peacekeeping forces involved in the alleged violations in 
the CAR, namely the forces authorized by the SC but not under UN command, and the forces 
under UN command.  
In the first place, regarding the forces not under UN command and the external law applicable 
to the UN, it should be assessed who exercised the effective control over the conduct of the 
authorized forces in the CAR in order to ascertain whether the conduct is to be attributed to 
the UN, to the particular TCC, or to both, and thus, whether these forces are bound by the set 
of customary international laws binding on the UN, in addition to the laws binding on their 
respective TCC. This effective control test will be plainly addressed in Section E.  
Secondly, concerning the second wave of allegations and therefore, turning to the 
peacekeeping forces under UN command, it should be noted that the same external laws 
above exposed surrounding the UN and its peacekeeping forces in the peace operations in 
the DRC, i.e. during MONUC and MONUSCO, are applicable to the UN peace forces in the 
CAR, but with the difference on another SC’s mandate, namely MINUSCA’s mandate, with 
similar priorities such as the protection of the civilian population.  
II. Human trafficking and sexual slavery  
The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children defines ‘trafficking in persons’ as:  
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation 
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal 
of organs.210  
This trafficking in human beings has also been labelled as a form of “modern slavery.”211 For 
its part, ‘sexual slavery’ has been defined by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the 
exercise of “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more 
persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by 
imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty” combined with the causing of “such person 
or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature”.212 
There is evidence supporting a strong correlation between the emergence of a conflict and the 
occurrence of the practice, or better said, between the conflict, the subsequent deployment of 
                                                          
210 Art. 3 (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  
211 Chuang, AJIL, Vol. 108, 2014, p. 609, 609; see also Anti-Slavery International, What is modern slavery?, 
https://www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/modern-slavery/ (last accessed on 21/04/2020).  
212 See ICC, Elements of Crimes, 2011, Definition of sexual slavery (Art. 8 (2)(b)(xxii)-2). 
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international presences in that region and the rise of human trafficking,213 especially when it 
comes to trafficking for sexual purposes as the situation in the former Yugoslavia, particularly 
in Kosovo, demonstrated. Thus, the peace mission deployed in Kosovo will be the focus of 
attention in brief in this Section.  
Going back in time to 1999 to the peace operation in Kosovo, the SC established the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)214 as well as an international 
security presence, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which would be “under UN auspices” and consist 
of “substantial NATO participation”, but “under unified command and control”.215 In other 
words, while UNMIK was clearly under direct UN command, KFOR was a NATO-led 
multinational peacekeeping force whereby the participating NATO and non-NATO countries 
had not transferred “full command” over their troops, rather only “operational control” and/or 
“operational command” enabling them to retain certain powers over their troops such as 
discipline and accountability.216 Moreover, COMKFOR, the commander of KFOR, was the one 
who retained “unified command and control”.217  
Apart from the already difficult spectrum of actors in the mission in the Kosovo, the problem 
further escalates as a result of the allegations involving principally members of both UNMIK 
police and KFOR troops in the trafficking and use of services of trafficked women and girls.218 
There was growing evidence of “significant organized prostitution in four locations close to 
major concentrations of KFOR troops. Most of the clients were reported to be members of the 
international military presence, while some KFOR soldiers were allegedly also involved in the 
trafficking process itself.”219 The alleged KFOR soldiers implicated appear to be mainly 
American, German, Italian, Russian and French.220 Women and girls were trafficked into 
Kosovo as well as out of it; some were also internally trafficked.221 By 2003-2004 there were 
reportedly in Kosovo more than 200 bars, clubs and related places where trafficked women 
                                                          
213 Some instances are Cambodia: See Koyama/Myrttinen, in: Aoi/De Coning/Thakur (eds.), pp. 23, 32-33; Martin, 
Must boys be boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions, 
http://www.pseataskforce.org/uploads/tools/mustboysbeboysendingseainunpeacekeepingmissions_refugeesinter
national_english.pdf, p. 4, (last accessed on 21/04/2020); East Timor: See also Koyama/Myrttinen, pp. 23, 34-35; 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: See also Martin, p. 5 and Amnesty International, Kosovo (Serbia & Montenegro) “So does 
that mean I have rights?” Protecting the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur70/010/2004/en/, p. 41, (last accessed on 21/04/2020); for Kosovo it will 
be examined below. 
214 UNSC Res. 1244 of 10/06/1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), Annex 2, paras. 3, 5.  
215 Ibid., Annex 2, paras. 3, 4.  
216 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on human rights in Kosovo: 
Possible establishment of review mechanisms, No. 280/2004, CDL-AD(2004)033, para. 14.  
217 Ibid.  
218 Amnesty International (note 213), p. 41; UNICEF/OHCHR/OSCE-ODIHR, Trafficking in Human Beings in 
Southeastern Europe, p. 96. 
219 See Amnesty International (note 213), p. 7; in the same vein, see Wareham, No Safe Place: An Assessment of 
Violence against Women in Kosovo, http://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/nosafeplace_kosovo.pdf, p. 93, (last 
accessed on 21/04/2020). 
220 See Wareham, (note 219), pp. 94-95. 
221 Amnesty International (note 213), p. 1; see also UNICEF/OHCHR/OSCE-ODIHR (note 218), pp. 96-97. 
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and girls were presumably forced into prostitution, and which were ascribed to the “off-limits 
list” for UNMIK personnel and KFOR forces.222  
Taking into consideration KFOR troops, since they are the military presence deployed in 
Kosovo and the focus of the Thesis, it should be noted that the responsibility will be examined 
on the basis of the effective control exercised over KFOR’s conduct by the international 
organizations or the States contributing troops. Be that as it may, whether KFOR was under 
the direct command of either the UN or NATO, due to their both being international 
organizations and subjects with international legal personality, they are both bound by 
customary IHRL and IHL. Both fields of customary law prohibit human trafficking and sexual 
slavery: 1) customary IHRL prohibits trafficking in persons through the prohibition of slavery,223 
since it has been considered a form of modern slavery,224 and sexual slavery, as the name 
implies, is also slavery and, as such, it has acquired a jus cogens225 status from which no 
derogations are permitted;226 2) in customary IHL human trafficking is also forbidden by the 
prohibition of slavery and the slave trade, and sexual slavery is also a prohibition of customary 
IHL,227 which at the same time, includes trafficking in persons in its concept of conduct 
amounting to sexual slavery.228 This shows that both human trafficking and sexual slavery are 
interrelated and that the nature of trafficking will always give rise to a certain form of slavery. 
However, it is worth mentioning that even though human trafficking and sexual slavery are 
                                                          
222 Amnesty International (note 213), pp. 1, 2, 7, 42.  
223 According to the so-called Restatement list, the prohibition on slavery constitutes a norm of customary IHRL: 
ALI, Restatement of the law, third. The foreign relations law of the United States, Vol. 2, 1987, para. 702, p. 161. 
See also the prohibition on slavery in Art. 4 of the UNGA Res 217 A (III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
10/12/1948, UN Doc. A/RES/3/217A.  
224 It has been claimed that “the travaux préparatoires to the Rome Statute indicate that the Statute intended to 
recognize and prosecute human trafficking as a form of modern day slavery”: See Kim, Prosecuting Human 
Trafficking as a Crime against Humanity under the Rome Statute, 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/gslonline/files/2011/02/Jane-Kim_GSL_Prosecuting-Human-Trafficking-as-a-Crime-
Against-Humanity-Under-the-Rome-Statute-2011.pdf, p. 7 (last accessed on 21/04/2020).  
The ICC has defined “enslavement” in Art. 7 (2)(c) of its Statute as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children.” Thus, including trafficking in the concept of enslavement.  
See, furthermore, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Others, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1-T, Judgment (Trial 
Chamber), 22 February 2001, paras. 539-540. 
In the case law of regional human rights bodies, see, e.g., ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, App. 
No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, paras. 281, 282. 
225 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: 
Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict, Final report submitted by Ms. Gay 
J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur of 22/06/1998, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, para. 30.  
226 See, e.g., Arts. 4 para. 2, and 8 ICCPR; Arts. 15 para. 2, and 4 ECHR.  
227 See the information about the ICC and the ICTY on supra note 224. 
For an extensive assessment see Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Vol. 1: Rules, Rule 94. Moreover, on the practice of this Rule 94 to be considered customary law follow: ICRC, 
Practice Relating to Rule 94. Slavery and Slave Trade, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule94 (last accessed on 21/04/2020). 




violations of IHL in general terms, the armed conflict in Kosovo ended in June 1999 with the 
establishment of UNMIK,229 and thus, IHL ceased to apply.  
Likewise, it should be observed that the enslavement of the civilian population amounts to war 
crimes in both international and non-international armed conflicts,230 which States have the 
obligation to prosecute.  
Consequently, irrespective of who is the bearer of responsibility in the present case of KFOR, 
it can be said that human trafficking and sexual slavery constituted violations of human rights 
in the peace operation in Kosovo by the KFOR troops led by NATO, but authorized by the UN 
(also by UNMIK personnel, but it does not enter in the scope of the analysis). In order to 
ascertain whether the UN, NATO or their respective participating States are responsible for 
the violations the prevailing opinion in this matter of controversy will have to be examined. 
E. Responsibility for the violations by United Nations 
Peacekeeping Forces 
Due to the special characteristics of peacekeeping, not only troops under UN command and 
control will be examined, but also troops mandated or authorized by the SC in conjunction or 
not with other international organizations such as NATO. This is because there are peace 
operations where it is difficult, if not almost impossible, to draw the line of what is under the 
direct command of the UN or, instead, of the respective participating States, resulting in no 
pure operation with clearly defined constituents and, consequently, in different opinions and 
case law regarding the bearer of responsibility for violations of human rights and IHL. Thus, is 
the UN, the particular participating State(s) or NATO responsible? Or, perhaps, can the UN 
and the participating State(s) be jointly responsible? One of the main criteria that have 
emerged in order to evaluate this matter of responsibility is the effective control test.  
But, first of all, the term ‘responsibility’ needs to be defined. Originally, States were the only 
subjects of international responsibility. However, with the development of international law and 
the recognition of the international legal personality of other subjects of international law, also 
international organizations and individuals231 can incur responsibility.232  
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Responsibility has been said to stem from the notion of “responding,” in order words, “[t]he 
response at issue here is the one a subject owes to other subjects when it has breached a 
legal obligation incumbent upon it.”233 In this respect, it has been described as “a mechanism 
having as its function the condemnation of breaches by subjects of international law of their 
legal obligations and the restoration of international legality, respect for international law being 
a matter in which the international community as a whole has an interest.”234 
The International Law Commission (ILC) has played a fundamental role in the codification of 
responsibility, first through the creation in 2001 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DARSIWA)235 and, thereafter with the adoption in 2011 of the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO)236. It is in this latter 
document where the effective control test can be found. Therefore, the subsequent analysis 
will help to understand the dimension of the notion, together with the explanation of the 
command and control structures in order to discern what effective control could mean. After 
this, the different case law will be presented to illustrate the evolution of the concept and the 
status quo leading in the direction of the UN, the participating State(s) or both being 
internationally responsible.  
I. A question of attribution of conduct: the effective control test 
According to the ILC, an internationally wrongful act of a State or international organization 
exists when two conditions are met, namely the conduct consisting of the particular action or 
omission 1) is attributable to the State/international organization under international law; and 
2) the conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State/international 
organization.237  
Having ascertained in previous sections that both the UN and the participating States in a 
peacekeeping operation are bound by human rights as well as humanitarian law norms, i.e. by 
international obligations, and that peacekeepers could violate both fields of international law 
engaging in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse and human trafficking and sexual slavery, 
the question now might be how to attribute the conduct of these peacekeeping forces to the 
UN, the TCCs or other international organizations participating in the peace operation. Given 
their status as national contingents at the disposal of the UN, the ILC has codified a rule of 
attribution for this special peacekeeping situation in its Article 7 DARIO, which reads as follows:  
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The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed 
at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under international law an 
act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.238  
As explained by the ILC, this Article would be applicable in the context of peacekeeping 
operations, owing to the fact that the military contingents placed at the disposal of the UN still 
act “to a certain extent” as organs or agents of their sending States or organization,239 since 
the States “[retain] disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over the members of the 
national contingent.”240 In the words of Salerno, this is the “organic link” that remains between 
the TCCs and its military forces.241  
Thus, as it can be deduced from the reading of Article 7 DARIO, the focus of the attribution of 
the specific conduct is going to be based on the effective control criterion. However, the ILC 
did not provide any definition of the concept. Therefore, the different interpretations and 
practice related to this standard have to be resorted to, without forgetting that it is a test which 
is still in development.  
One of the first international cases in which this standard was upheld was the Nicaragua case, 
where the ICJ sustained that the State had to exercise “effective control” over the alleged 
conduct of the individual groups in order to be held responsible, seemingly signifying directing 
or enforcing the commission of the acts.242 This standard was further reaffirmed in the 
Genocide case, but with a different meaning to that of giving instructions or providing 
directions.243 However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
opted in the Tadić case for the “overall control” criterion, holding that the attribution of conduct 
of organized groups to the State required that the former were under the overall control of the 
State.244 Even though these cases introduced different standards, they did not address 
peacekeeping operations and they may still seem confusing.  
Thus, in the peacekeeping context, one source of interpretation is the ILC’s commentary on 
the Articles. There the ILC specifies that the effective control criterion is based on the “factual 
control” exercised over the conduct in question, and that the “full factual circumstances and 
particular context” should also be considered when examining the particular conduct.245 It is, 
furthermore, a criterion that is certainly interrelated with the notion of “command and control” 
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in peacekeeping operations.246 Consequently, it is crucial to understand the command and 
control structures in these operations. 
1. Command and control of a Peacekeeping Operation 
Command and control, commonly known as C2 in the military field, has been said to be related 
to “the authority vested in certain individuals (or bodies) to direct the actions and exercise 
authority over (elements of) assigned resources, such as members of […] the armed forces.”247 
They are both terms which are “closely linked and complement each other;”248 command refers 
to the authority itself of a commander,249 and control to the exercise of that authority.250 
As expressed in Section B.I., there are different levels of authority, command and control that 
come into play and interact with each other in a UN peacekeeping operation, namely strategic, 
operational and tactical. The interaction between these shape the command and control 
structure in a peace operation and, therefore, account must be taken of the following notions 
which are included in the aforementioned levels: “full or national command”, “operational 
command and control”, “tactical command and control” and “administrative control.” 
While “full or national command” and “administrative control” are powers retained by the TCCs 
owing to the existent “organic link” between the States and its military forces,251 “operational 
command and control” are generally transferred to the UN or to the organization undertaking 
the operation,252 and “tactical command and control”, although retained to a great extent by 
the TCCs, are exercised in coordination with “operational command and control”.253  
Firstly, with regard to the powers normally retained by the participating States, “full or national 
command” comprises “strategic level command,” which is an expression of national 
sovereignty and cannot be delegated, and is linked with the authority to decide the participation 
of a given State’s armed forces in the peace mission or the withdrawal of the same;254 
“administrative control” involves the authority of the participating States to exercise 
administrative, disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over their national contingents, but 
the organization conducting the operation may also adopt administrative measures regarding 
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the misconduct of the personnel, such as orders of repatriation;255 and, “tactical command and 
control” entail the authority delegated to subordinate commanders to assign tasks to other 
units and subunits in order to carry out the objectives of the mission, and it implies the 
appointment of a contingent commander by the TCC who will exercise tactical command and 
control over the deployed national contingent.256  
In terms of “operational command and control”, they deserve a separate Section due to the 
implications and importance assigned to this level for the purpose of attributing the conduct for 
the wrongdoing of the peacekeeping forces to the UN or the TCCs.  
2. “Effective operational control” of a Peacekeeping Operation  
As previously introduced, “operational command and/or operational control” are the level of 
authority which will normally be transferred to the UN by the TCCs in a UN peacekeeping 
operation.257 By contrast, in mandated or authorized peace operations, this level of authority 
will be delegated by the SC to the regional or international organization conducting the 
operation, such as NATO, or to a leading nation participating in the operation.258  
Operational command is, thus, “the authority vested in an individual or body to assign specific 
tasks or missions to subordinate commanders, to deploy units within the area of operations, to 
reassign forces, and to retain or delegate elements of operational or tactical level command 
[…] or control,”259 and operational control “the authority of a commander over part of the 
activities of subordinate level commanders or other persons placed temporarily under his 
control and is normally an attribute of operational level command.”260  
In a UN peacekeeping operation, the transfer of these elements of operational authority to the 
UN is done through a Transfer of Authority Agreement (TOA) or a MOU,261 and it consists of a 
chain of command which involves several main actors possessing operational level authority, 
command and control responsibilities, namely a HOM, which can be at the same time the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), a HOMC, a HOPC and a Director 
of Mission Support (DMS).262 The HOM shall report and be responsible to the SG through the 
USG DPKO, has overall authority over the activities implemented during the mission and 
regulates the delegation of authority for the fulfilment of the mandate’s objectives to the heads 
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of all components of the mission.263 For its part, the HOMC shall report and be responsible to 
the HOM and is the one who exercises operational control over all military personnel, setting 
up the military operational chain of command in the field.264   
As a result of the retention of powers by the TCCs (full or national command, administrative 
control and tactical command and control) over their armed forces, and the transfer of some 
authority to the organization undertaking the peace operation (operational command and 
control), the question now might be: On which command and control powers the attribution of 
the particular acts or omissions of the peace forces to either the UN, or another organization 
such as NATO or the TCC shall be based?    
Whereas the UN claims its “exclusive command and control over peacekeeping forces,” the 
ILC states that the attribution of conduct should be subject to a factual control examination or, 
in other words, be based on the effective control over the conduct.265 In this vein, in its 
commentary on Article 7 DARIO, the ILC suggests that “operational control” would be a correct 
interpretation of the effective control criterion.266 This view had been previously endorsed by 
the International Law Association (ILA), which held that the responsibility of an international 
organization for organs placed at its disposal was dependent upon “the [organization’s] 
authority to exercise effective control (operational command and control) over the activities of 
that organ.”267 Furthermore, the SG had also supported this position maintaining that “the 
international responsibility of the United Nations will be limited to the extent of its effective 
operational control.”268  
Thus, with operational command and control on the focus of the interpretations, Milanović and 
Papić suggest that the question to identify the holder of effective control should be “who is 
giving the orders – the state or the organization?”269 On the other hand, Dannenbaum 
conceives that not only the command and control structures in place and the factual 
circumstances are indicators for the attribution of conduct, but rather the ability to prevent an 
act in question is a safer proof of the effective control exercised either by the UN or the TCC,270 
especially for ultra vires abuses, i.e. “[when] peacekeepers act beyond the authority granted 
them by the UN.”271 
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The interpretations of the effective control test and other tests applied by international and 
national courts will be subsequently reviewed in order to ascertain which is the prevailing 
opinion leading to the responsibility of the UN, the TCC or other organizations like NATO.  
II. Is the United Nations responsible for the violations? 
A controversial decision leading in the direction of the responsibility of the UN has been the 
joined cases Behrami and Saramati272 handed down by the ECtHR in 2007, where it dealt with 
an admissibility decision. Concretely, the Behrami case concerned the death of a boy and 
serious injury of his brother, in Kosovo in March 2000, caused by the detonation of a cluster 
bomb that had been dropped on the site by NATO during its bombardment in 1999.273 The 
applicants’ complaint against France was based on Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), accusing French KFOR troops of their failure to mark or defuse the 
undetonated bombs on the site, and their awareness thereof.274  
The Saramati case comprised the arrest of the applicant by UNMIK police from April to June 
2001, and his new detention by order of a KFOR Commander (first a Norwegian officer, 
replaced by a French general) in July 2001.275 He claimed a violation by Norway and France 
of Article 5 of the ECHR alone, and in conjunction with Article 13 of the ECHR in terms of his 
extra-judicial detention in July 2001, and of Article 6 para. 1 on account of his lack of access 
to court, alleging also that the respondent States infringed their positive obligations to 
guarantee the Convention rights vis-à-vis the people of Kosovo.276  
As it has already been introduced, the ECtHR ruled that the impugned acts and omissions of 
KFOR and UNMIK were attributable only to the UN and, thus, that it was incompetent ratione 
personae to review the alleged violations, declaring the case inadmissible.277 However, the 
Court has received fierce criticism for its judgment. 
In a clear attempt to avoid to decide on the issues of norm conflict and state jurisdiction,278 
Milanović and Papić maintain that the ruling of the ECtHR is rather incongruous since the main 
question raised before the Court was about the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR, i.e. 
whether the applicants fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent States within the meaning 
of Article 1 of the ECHR and, instead, the Court solved the cases by means of dealing with the 
issue of attribution of conduct, but in a misleading manner linking attribution with delegation of 
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powers rather than with international responsibility.279 As stated by these scholars, the 
“delegation-means-attribution rationale”280 introduced by the Court is inappropriate because 
there is a significant difference between the rules of attribution and international responsibility, 
and the issue of delegation, which is a part of the institutional law of international organizations 
related to the ability of their organs to entrust powers to other entities and, therefore, it cannot 
determine the responsibility of a State or international organization for its acts or omissions.281 
Furthermore, the ECtHR not only was unsatisfactory in terms of the aforementioned reasoning 
to solve the joined cases, but also presented a new test for attribution (delegation in the Court’s 
opinion) of conduct in peace operations, namely the “ultimate authority and control”282 test, 
whereby it based its assumption on the fact that “Resolution 1244 constituted a lawful 
delegation of powers by the [SC] within the limits of Chapter VII of the UN Charter”283 in order 
to attribute the conduct to the UN. Thus, it sustained that “the UNSC was to retain ultimate 
authority and control over the security mission and it delegated to NATO […] the power to 
establish, as well as the operational command of, the international presence, KFOR.”284 
Be that as it may, the rationale followed by the Court together with the test are proof of the 
inconsistence of the judgment and of the unfeasibility of applying a criterion that is scarcely 
supported in the legal literature and practice.285 The most supported criterion for the attribution 
of conduct in peace operations is the effective control test seemingly meaning operational 
command or control,286 or, in other words, the ability to give orders.287 It is argued that this is 
the test that should have been applied by the ECtHR to examine the attribution of the acts or 
omissions of both UNMIK and KFOR.288 Even though the Court did refer to “effective control” 
and to the ILC and Article 5 DARIO (now Article 7),289 it seems dubious that the Court actually 
implemented it. For its part, the ILC expressly reacted to this decision of the ECtHR in its 
commentary on Article 7, para. 10 DARIO, showing its disagreement with the judgment and 
upholding its “effective control” criterion.290 
That the conduct of UNMIK was attributable to the UN would not be contested by the UN itself, 
since UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN,291 and the practice of this international 
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organization is to claim “exclusive command and control” over national contingents in its 
peacekeeping operations (under UN command).292 Yet, as mentioned above in Section E.I.2., 
for the ILC this also shall be based on a “factual criterion”.293  
On the other hand, regarding the conduct of KFOR (authorized forces), it is even less 
undisputed that the effective control test had to be applied by the ECtHR in order to attribute 
the acts or omissions of KFOR to either NATO and/or the TCCs, but not to the UN, since 
operational command or control not only was delegated by the SC to NATO, but it was also 
effectively exercised by the TCCs and NATO.294 Therefore, some scholars295 suggest that the 
ECtHR should have examined as well the possibility of dual attribution of conduct of KFOR 
troops to both the accused TCCs and NATO. Another step that the Court forgot to assess. 
It may well be that the reason for this decision of the ECtHR to shift responsibility from the 
TCCs solely to the UN was that States might be discouraged from participating in and 
contributing troops to future peace operations if they are compelled to observe human rights 
standards even more carefully.296  
Despite this unfortunate ruling, perhaps the most concerning of all is the “message of 
unaccountability sent by a court of human rights.”297 The ECtHR has reaffirmed its decision of 
Behrami and Saramati to dismiss other complaints brought before it relating to alleged human 
rights violations in Kosovo.298 Furthermore, with judgments such as those of Behrami and 
Saramati, the immunity that the UN enjoys from civil process in any court was also reiterated.299  
III. Is the participating State responsible? 
A judgment that is frequently contrasted to the Behrami and Saramati joined cases is the Al-
Jedda300 case. Unlike the former cases, Al-Jedda leads in the direction of the responsibility of 
the TCCs participating in a peace operation. The case concerned the detention of the 
applicant, Mr Al-Jedda, by British forces operating within the framework of the Multinational 
Force (MNF) in Iraq,301 which was a coalition of forces authorized under several SC 
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Resolutions302 to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security 
and stability in Iraq,”303 including preventive detention as argued by the United Kingdom (UK) 
Government.304 He brought the case before UK domestic courts, but his claims were rejected 
in favour of the Government.305 He then filed a complaint against the UK before the ECtHR 
claiming a violation of Article 5 para. 1 of the ECHR, since he alleged to have been unlawfully 
held in internment by British armed forces between 2004 and 2007.306  
Consequently, the ECtHR was compelled to decide on the issue of state jurisdiction, i.e. 
whether the applicant fell within the jurisdiction of the UK by virtue of Article 1 of the ECHR.307 
In doing so, the Court touched upon other important questions relating to norm conflict, dual 
attribution of conduct and the law of international responsibility, and the relationship between 
the ECHR and other branches of public international law,308 such as IHL309.  
Detaching itself from its previous judgment in the Behrami and Saramati joined cases, the 
ECtHR held in the Al-Jedda case that the conduct of the British forces (the internment) was 
attributable to the UK and, therefore, that the applicant fell within the UK’s jurisdiction.310 
However, instead of overruling Behrami and Saramati and its “delegation-means-attribution 
rationale,”311 what the Court did was to follow the reasoning of the House of Lords 
differentiating Behrami and Saramati from Al-Jedda on the facts, 312 (even though essentially 
KFOR and MNF were both SC authorized operations, but deployed in different settings).  
Firstly, with regard to the attribution of conduct and claiming factual differences between 
Behrami and Saramati and Al-Jedda, the Court determined that “the United Nations Security 
Council had neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and 
omissions of troops within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention was not, 
therefore, attributable to the United Nations.”313 The Court alludes then to the above mentioned 
effective control test proposed by the ILC and supported by legal scholars, but still does not 
recognize either the applicability of this criterion or its own test or the test which is actually 
implementing, if any, for determining to whom the conduct of the British forces is attributable 
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and, thus, who is responsible.314 This gives rise to uncertainties as to whether the Court will 
finally abandon its ultimate authority and control test, and launches again a debate on whether 
the effective control test is “the sole or even the most appropriate principle of attribution during 
international military operations.”315 By contrast, the Court introduced a positive development 
by implicitly opening the door to the possibility of dual or multiple attribution of conduct to the 
UN and TCCs.316  
Secondly, concerning norm conflict, the House of Lords and the ECtHR did not arrive at the 
same conclusion. The House of Lords ruled that Article 5 of the ECHR had not been breached, 
since SC resolutions displaced Article 5 para. 1 insofar as a conflict arose between them by 
virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter.317 For its part, the ECtHR took a step forward 
in the protection of human rights with the following interpretative presumption that it created, 
i.e. the Court considered that where the SC prescribes member States to take measures which 
would conflict with their IHRL’s obligations, the language used by the SC must be free from 
ambiguity, otherwise the Court would opt for “the interpretation which is most in harmony with 
the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations.”318 In this 
respect, the ECtHR compared the non-binding obligation of internment as a security measure 
that States could make use of, but were not obliged to use, with their binding obligation under 
Article 5 para. 1 of the ECHR, to say that there was no conflict between the UK’s obligations 
under the UN Charter and its obligations under Article 5 para. 1 of the ECHR and, therefore, it 
held that the latter provision applied and Mr Al-Jedda had been unlawfully held in internment.319  
Nevertheless, Milanović sustains that despite the successful contribution of the Court, the 
prevalence of Resolution 1546 over the ECHR in the given case remains still unsettled, as well 
as whether Article 103 of the UN Charter can cover authorizations, and not only obligations as 
the same Article explicitly refers to.320  
Turning now to the case law of domestic courts and the issue of attribution and responsibility 
for wrongful acts, the judgment that the Dutch Court of Appeal of The Hague delivered in the 
Nuhanović321 case is very promising as for the development of the effective control standard, 
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the recognition of the possibility of dual or multiple attribution of conduct and the opportunity 
for the victims to obtain redress for the peacekeepers’ wrongdoings.322  
Briefly, in the Nuhanović case the Court of Appeal held the Netherlands responsible for the 
death of Nuhanović’s relatives, who in July 1995 had been forced by Dutchbat to leave the 
compound in Srebrenica where they had sought refuge,323 once the mission had failed324 and 
the civilian refugees were going to be evacuated by the Bosnian Serb Army,325 even when 
Dutchbat was aware of the atrocities these forces were committing with the refugees.326 
Dutchbat was a Dutch battalion of peacekeepers operating in the area of Srebrenica for the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) under UN command during the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia.327 
The attribution of the conduct of Dutchbat to the Netherlands was based on a revolutionary 
interpretation of the effective control test, as the Court accepted and affirmed the applicability 
of this criterion for the attribution of conduct of the peacekeepers and, at the same time, 
introduced the notion of the “power to prevent” for acts that had not been directly ordered, in 
the Court’s own words: “[S]ignificance should be given to the question whether that conduct 
constituted the execution of a specific instruction, issued by the UN or the State, but also to 
the question whether, if there was no such specific instruction, the UN or the State had the 
power to prevent the conduct concerned.”328 In doing so, it followed the interpretation of this 
standard already made by Dannenbaum when it raised the question: “[W]hich entity was 
positioned to have acted differently in a way that would have prevented the impugned 
conduct?”329  
On another note, it is said that maybe the most important contribution of the Court of Appeal 
was to explicitly acknowledge “the possibility that more than one party has ‘effective 
control,’”330 i.e. the recognition of dual or multiple attribution of conduct of peacekeeping forces 
to the UN, TCCs and/or other participating entities, such as NATO. Even though the Court did 
not examine the conditions that would enable this attribution of conduct to more than one entity, 
the Nuhanović case is the first judicial decision where that possibility is actually addressed (the 
case was rendered some days before the Al-Jedda331 case, which implicitly touches upon this 
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possibility).332 The possibility of dual or multiple attribution in the peacekeeping framework has 
also been advanced in academic writings333 and in the work of the ILC334. 
In the same vein, the Dutch Court of Appeal reaffirmed the effective control test in the Mothers 
of Srebrenica335 case, stating that effective control was related to the “factual control” over 
instructions,336 and thus, that the Netherlands was responsible for the conduct of Dutchbat only 
from the moment it was clear that the mission had failed and the evacuation of the refuges 
from the compound was decided, since it was then when the Netherlands exercised its 
effective control over the acts of Dutchbat.337  
Therefore, having determined that the UN as well as TCCs can incur responsibility for the 
conduct of peace forces, one more question should be added: What is the likelihood of NATO 
being held responsible for violations when it takes part in peace operations? Here the 
possibility of dual or multiple attribution of conduct also plays a fundamental role that should 
not be underestimated. 
IV. Could other participating international organizations such as NATO 
assume responsibility? 
As is well-known, NATO is a political and military alliance of States founded in 1949 by the 
North Atlantic Treaty with the main purpose of the maintenance of peace and security through 
collective defence.338 The participation of NATO in UN mandated or authorized peace 
operations is well-established due to NATO’s significant military capabilities,339 which have 
positioned it as “the UN’s enforcement arm to ensure the effective implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolutions.”340 However, this participation is not free from controversy as the 
issue of responsibility in authorized operations comes often into question.  
For NATO to be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts, it must first meet the 
requirement of having international legal personality.341 Just like the UN, it has already been 
submitted that NATO is an international organization which possesses international legal 
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personality.342 Once this has been ascertained, who should then incur responsibility in 
authorized operations when NATO takes part: the UN, the participating States or NATO? The 
answer is to be found in the work of the ILC, concretely in the above introduced Article 7 DARIO 
and its effective control test.343  
“The question is if the UN, through the Security Council […] authorizations […], has effective 
control over the conduct of states and/or international organizations that implement those 
authorizations.”344 As already mentioned, this authorization was enough for the ECtHR in its 
Behrami and Saramati decision to determine that the UN was alone responsible for the conduct 
of UNMIK and KFOR. Yet, as argued by scholars, instead of its highly criticized ultimate 
authority and control test, it should have applied the effective control test and thus, attribute 
the conduct of KFOR to NATO and hold it internationally responsible.345 
Consequently, it is established that NATO should be held responsible whenever it exercises 
effective control over the particular alleged misconduct of the forces during its participation in 
authorized peace operations, i.e. when there is evidence that suggests it has been vested with 
the operational command and/or control that empowers it to effectively give orders and 
instructions to the troops.  
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The prevailing opinion in the legal literature as well as in the international and national case 
law is that the effective control test is the most suitable in order to attribute peacekeepers’ 
conduct to either the UN, or the TCCs or other participating organizations such as NATO and, 
thus, to determine the international responsibility of one of these subjects with legal 
personality. Furthermore, the door has been opened to the possibility of dual or multiple 
attribution of conduct in peace operations. This is perhaps the most reasonable way of 
attributing conduct not only in peacekeeping, but especially in peace enforcement (authorized) 
operations since the several parties involved retain different levels of command and control 
powers and there can be situations where more than one party has effective control over the 
acts or omissions in question. 
Once ascertained that the effective control test is the most accepted standard of attribution, 
the question might be: What does effective control actually mean? Although there is not a 
definition of the same, it has been said to mean the power to give orders and instructions in 
peace operations. This is certainly related with the level of operational command and/or 
control, which is the closer layer to the field level where orders are given and implemented. 
Furthermore, the ILC maintains that significant consideration should also be given to the 
factual circumstances in each particular situation.  
However, the interpretation of effective control as the power to give orders is not the most 
appropriate in our context of violations of human rights and IHL committed by peacekeepers, 
since these forces do not receive orders to commit sexual exploitation and abuse and human 
trafficking and sexual slavery, or at least, that is to be expected. For this reason, effective 
control as the power to prevent the wrongful conduct introduced by Dannenbaum and 
subsequently acknowledged by the Dutch Court of Appeal in the Nuhanović case would be 
more adequate when the particular conduct involves violations of human rights and IHL 
committed ultra vires. The party which was in a better position to have prevented the alleged 
violations is the one that should be held internationally responsible. 
Whereas the ultimate authority and control test introduced by the ECtHR in Behrami and 
Saramati is unsatisfactory and would allow States to escape responsibility,346 it is also claimed 
that the “full command”347 that States retain at all times over their forces could be detrimental 
if the conduct were to be attributed always to States on the basis of this broad power.348 
Conversely, it would bring about positive implications in the eradication of the problem of 
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sexual exploitation and abuse and human trafficking and sexual slavery in peace operations 
owing to the fact that States would strengthen their control over their forces and would definitely 
send competent and trained troops to the missions. That is, after all, our purpose: That peace 
forces stop committing violations of human rights and IHL, that they protect the civilian 
population they are sent to safeguard, instead of abusing them. Therefore, some middle 
ground has to be reached where neither the UN, nor TCCs or NATO can circumvent 
responsibility for the violations committed by the forces. A possible solution for this is dual or 
multiple attribution of conduct.  
On the other hand, with regard to the second element for an internationally wrongful act to 
exist, i.e. a breach of an international obligation of the State or international organization, it is 
submitted that they both have rights and duties by virtue of their international legal personality. 
While States have treaty obligations and are also bound by customary international law, 
international organizations are only bound by the latter, since they are not parties to treaties. 
Be that as it may, sexual exploitation and abuse and human trafficking and sexual slavery 
constitute violations of both IHRL and IHL in treaty law, as well as being prohibited in customary 
international law, and some have even acquired jus cogens status.   
The UN Charter was concluded “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”349 Apart from being 
undisputed that this is obsolete and utopic since wars are still happening in our world, the 
untold sorrow of the victims of human rights and IHL violations by UN peacekeeping forces 
and the inaction both by the UN and TCCs is sometimes even more gruesome than the mere 
fact of wars occurring, since it has been proved that humanity is unable to live without conflicts 
and blood. When peace forces are sent to a zone that is in desperate need of their help and, 
instead, they keep practicing the egregious acts they were sent to prevent, the only thing that 
is plain from all this is that we, humans, have failed as species. No one deserves to live in 
conflict but, above all, no one deserves to be sexually exploited or abused, trafficked or held 
in slavery, among other hideous abuses and atrocities added to the already disaster of war. 
Neither children, nor women or men. 
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